ABSTRACT
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, increasing attention has focused on the influence of gender and racial diversity on boards of directors. 1 Sixteen countries now require quotas to increase women's representation on boards, and many more have voluntary quotas in corporate governance codes. 2 In the United States, support for diversity has grown in principle, but progress has lagged in practice, and controversy has centered on whether and why diversity matters. 3 The stakes in this debate are substantial. Corporate boards affect the lives of millions of employees and consumers, and the policies and practices of the global marketplace. As recent scandals demonstrate, failures in board governance can carry an enormous cost; Enron is a notorious example. 4 Who gains access to these boards is therefore an issue of broad social importance.
This article argues that increasing diversity should be a social priority, but not for the reasons often assumed. Part II begins the discussion by reviewing the underrepresentation of women and minorities on corporate boards. review of the research on board diversity, financial performance, and good governance and concludes that the "business case for diversity" is less compelling than other reasons rooted in social justice, equal opportunity, and corporate reputation. 6 Part IV turns to the barriers to achieving greater diversity, 7 and Part V explores strategies that could address them. 8 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS A. Female and Minority Representation on Corporate Boards
Close to three-quarters of members of corporate boards of the largest American companies are white men. 9 According to the most recent data, women hold only 16.9% of the seats on Fortune 500 boards. 10 Women occupy 14.8% of Fortune 501-1000 board seats 11 and only 11.9% of board seats in Russell 3000 companies. 12 The situation in other nations is not markedly better, with the exception of those countries that have mandated quotas. 13 In the U.S., people of color also occupy a very small percentage of board seats. Among the Standard and Poor's (S&P) 200, 13% of the 6 See infra Part III. 7 See infra Part IV. 8 See infra Part V. 9 THE ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, MISSING PIECES: WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON FORTUNE 500 BOARDS -FACT SHEET, at 2 (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/M786-RDX9 (reporting that white males accounted for 73.3% of Fortune 500 company board seats). 10 Women on Boards: Quick Take, CATALYST (Mar. 3, 2014) , archived at http://perma.cc/LGC5-U7JR; RACHEL SOARES ET AL., 2013 CATALYST CENSUS: FORTUNE 500 WOMEN BOARD DIRECTORS 1 (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/QE4D-QDKB.
11 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS GENDER DIVERSITY INDEX 4 (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/6GNR-XH8F.
12 GMI RATINGS, GMI RATINGS' 2013 WOMEN ON BOARDS SURVEY 17 (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/7AB2-B49K. 13 See generally DELOITTE, WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (3d ed. 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/P4LE-W975 (discussing Asian, American, European, African, and Middle-Eastern countries). Norway, which had the first quota law, has the greatest percentage, having 42% women. Id. at 15. France, which also has mandatory quotas, has 22.5% of women serving on the boards of SBF120 listed companies. Id. By other measures, however, progress-especially in the past decade-has stalled. For S&P 1500 companies, the share of board seats held by women has only grown from 11% in 2006 to 14% in 2012. 27 Women are also underrepresented as chairs of compensation, audit, and nominating committees, which are among the most influential board positions. 28 At current rates of change, it would take almost seventy years before women's representation on corporate boards reached parity with that of men. , the number of S&P 500 firms without any minority members actually increased from 36% to 41%, and the number of firms with only one minority member also grew from 58% to 81%. Phred Dvorak, Some Things Don't Change: Sarbanes-Oxley Was Expected to Increase the Number of Minority Directors; What Happened?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2008, at R4. 31 In Fortune 500 companies, African-American males' representation "[dropped] from 5.7% to 5.5%[], and the representation remained stagnant for [African American] women at 1.9%." THE ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, supra note 9, at 2. V o l . 3 9 receive as much scrutiny from those promoting gender diversity in the boardroom . . . ." 32 Moreover, some of the most encouraging numbers on board diversity may conceal less promising trends. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act led many corporations to reduce overall board size, meaning that the same number of women and minority directors may comprise a greater percentage of a now smaller board. 33 In addition, much of the increase in women and minority directors over the last decade may reflect the same individuals sitting on more boards rather than the appointment of new individuals as directors. 34 Many commentators worry that these "trophy directors," who may serve on as many as seven boards, are spread too thin to provide adequate oversight. 35 Another concern is that the appointment of one or two token female or minority members will decrease pressure for continued diversity efforts. 36 
III. THE CASE FOR DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS
The growing consensus within the corporate community is that diversity is an important goal. 37 The case for diversity rests on two primary claims. The first is that diversity provides equal opportunity to groups historically excluded from positions of power. The public has a "strong [] interest in ensuring that opportunities are available to all, . . . that women [and minorities] entering the labour market are able to fulfil their potential, and that we make full use of the wealth of talented women . . ." and minorities available for board service. 38 The second 32 BARRETT, supra note 28. Although 89% of S&P 500 companies have at least one woman director, only 60% of companies in the Russell 3000 have any women. Id. 33 claim is that diversity will improve organizational processes and performance. This "business case for diversity" tends to dominate debates in part because it appeals to a culture steeped in shareholder value as the metric for corporate decision making.
39
This is also the claim on which controversy centers, so it is the focus of the discussion below.
A. Diversity and Firm Performance
Despite increasing references to acceptance of the business case for diversity, empirical evidence on the issue is mixed. While some studies have found positive correlations between board diversity and various measures of firm performance, 40 others have found the opposite 41 or no significant relationship.
42
The discussion below reviews these findings, as well as their methodological limitations. One of the most significant constraints is the shortage of studies on racial and ethnic diversity. Most of the modern research focuses on gender, from which commentators often generalize without qualification.
Studies Finding a Positive Relationship
One of the most frequently cited studies in support of board diversity is a 2007 Catalyst study. 43 It ranked Fortune 500 companies according to the percentage of women on their boards and found that, from 2001 to 2004, companies in the highest quartile outperformed companies in the lowest quartile by 53% in return on equity (ROE), 42% in return on sales (ROS), and 66% in return on invested capital (ROIC). 44 This study was a univariate analysis, which compares the means of two groups but does not include any control variables that might explain a correlation. 45 The results of such a means comparison can also be skewed by any extreme values in the group. 46 Further, the study did not specify whether the reported differences in means were statistically significant, which could also distort results. 47 In addition, the strength of these relationships did not hold up in Catalyst found that companies with at least one female director had higher net income growth during a six-year period than companies with no women directors (14% versus 10%); companies with a market capitalization of more than $10 billion that have women on their boards had share price performance 26% higher than comparable businesses with all-male boards.
50
This study also used a means comparison of groups of companies and thus is subject to many of the same criticisms as the Catalyst study.
51
Other studies, using regression analyses, have also found a positive relationship between board diversity and various measures of firm performance in samples of U.S. companies. Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader examined five years of data for 112 large companies and found a significant positive correlation between gender and minority representation on boards and return on assets (ROA) and return on investment (ROI). 52 Adams and Ferreira also found a positive significant relationship between the proportion of female directors and financial performance in 1,066 publicly traded companies as measured by Tobin's Q (the ratio of the market value of a firm divided by the replacement cost of its assets), but they found no relationship or a negative relationship between board gender diversity and ROA. 53 Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, and Simpson's study of major U.S. corporations listed in the S&P 500 index, found that gender and ethnic diversity on the board had a significant positive effect on ROA, although it found no effect on Tobin's Q. 54 Another study by Carter et GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REV. 396, 400 (2010) (using ordinary least squares regression with firm and time fixed effects and three-stage least squares with firm and time fixed effects on a sample of S&P 500 firms for the period 1998-2002 to measure the effect of women and minorities board representation on Tobin's Q and ROA). This study also found a positive and significant relationship between the number of women on important board committees and ROA, but it found no relationship to gender or ethnic diversity on boards or committees when V o l . 3 9 between the percentages of women and minorities on the board and return on assets and equity. 55 Studies in other countries have also found a positive correlation between gender diversity on boards and measures of financial performance. In Australian firms, Bonn found a positive relationship between the proportion of female directors and book-to-market ratio, while Nguyen and Faff found a positive link between gender diversity and Tobin's Q. 56 Campbell and Minguez-Vera found a significant and positive relationship in Spanish firms between the gender composition on boards and Tobin's Q. 57 In a study of Dutch companies, LuckerathRovers found a significant positive relationship between female board representation and return on equity. 58 In a study of Israeli companies in which the government owned a substantial equity interest and required relative gender balance on boards, Schwartz-Ziv found that the ROE and net profit margin were significantly higher in companies with at least three women on their boards. the presence of one or more women on the board does not have a significant effect on firm value, but the ratio of women to men on the board has a significant positive effect on firm value as measured by an approximation of Tobin's Q). The authors concluded that the gender diversity was causing the increase in firm value because they did not find that firm value had a similar effect on diversity. Id.
58 Luckerath-Rovers, supra note 43, at 499-503 (studying ninety-nine listed Dutch companies and finding a positive relationship between board gender diversity and return on equity but no relationship with return on sales or return on invested capital Of course, such correlations do not demonstrate causation. A few studies have claimed to show that board diversity leads to improved financial performance, but causal linkages are extremely difficult to prove.
60
As other studies have suggested, it could be that better firm performance leads to increased board diversity rather than the reverse.
61
More successful firms may be better positioned to attract the female and minority candidates in high demand for board service.
62
Larger and better-performing organizations may have more resources to devote to pursuing diversity and may face more pressure from the public and large institutional investors to increase diversity on the board. 63 Finally, some third factor could be causing both improved performance and greater board diversity. Several other studies of U.S. firms found no relationship or a negative relationship between board diversity and firm performance. Looking at a random sample of one hundred Fortune 500 corporations, Zahra and Stanton found the ratio of board member minorities, including 60 See, e.g., Campbell & Minguez-Vera, supra note 57, at 446-48 (concluding that gender diversity had a significant causal effect on firm value as measured by an approximation of Tobin's Q, but performance did not have a similar effect on diversity). 61 women, was inversely related to the organization's financial performance in terms of profitability and efficiency. 65 They found no relationship between diversity and ROE, profit margin, sales to equity, earnings per share, or dividends per share. 66 Another early study by Shrader et al. concluded that although the proportion of female managers was significantly and positively related to return on sales, ROA, ROE, and ROIC, the proportion of female directors was not significant. 67 Carter et al. found no significant relationship between financial performance, as measured by Tobin's Q, and the number of women or minority directors on the board or on certain board committees. 68 In a study of 250 listed companies from 2000-2006, Hussein and Kiwia found no relationship between female board representation and Tobin's Q. 69 Miller and Triana's 2009 research found no significant relationship between board gender diversity and return on investment or return on sales. 70 O'Reilly and Main's analysis of 2000 firms found no positive association "between either the number of women outside directors on the board or the addition of a woman to the board on [return on assets]." 71 In addition, a meta-analysis of 85 studies of board composition found little evidence that it has any effect on firm performance. 72 In 2009, Adams and Ferreira studied a sample of firms from 1996-2003 and found a negative relationship between gender diversity and both ROA and Tobin's Q. 73 The authors concluded "the positive correlation between performance and gender diversity shown in prior literature is not robust to any method of addressing the endogeneity of gender diversity. If anything, the relation appears to be negative." 74 In well-governed firms, increased gender diversity on boards seemed to decrease profitability and stock prices.
75
A study of 400 leading U.S. corporations between 1997 and 2005, by Dobbin and Jung, found that increases in board gender diversity had no effect on subsequent profitability but were followed by marginally significant decreases in stock value. 76 The authors concluded that non-blockholding institutional investor bias-rather than changes in the board's behavior or capabilities-may explain the negative effects.
77
Studies of board diversity in other countries have also found no link to various measures of firm performance. For Canadian firms, Francoeur et al. found a positive correlation between female officers and financial performance, but no relationship between women directors and performance. 78 In a recent study of UK listed companies, GregorySmith, Main, and O'Reilly found no significant relationship between the proportion of women directors and ROA, ROE, total shareholder return, or the price to book ratio. 
81
A study of Norwegian firms found a negative effect of quotas on performance.
82
Other research on Scandinavian firms has found no relationship between board diversity and organizational performance. 
Explanations for the Inconclusive Results
In sum, the empirical research on the effect of board diversity on firm performance is inconclusive, and the results are highly dependent on methodology. The mixed results reflect the different time periods, countries, economic environments, types of companies, and measures of diversity and financial performance. The relationship between board characteristics and firm performance likely varies by country because of the different regulatory and governance structures, economic climate and culture, and size of capital markets.
84
Some researchers attribute the varied findings to the methodological shortcomings in many of the studies, including small sample size, short-term observations of performance, and the difficulty of controlling for reverse causation, female and minority directors and subsequent ROA, ROE, or shareholder return, and concluding that because higher percentages of female and minority directors do not lead to poor performance, companies can achieve greater board diversity without negatively affecting shareholder wealth). 81 endogeneity, and other omitted variables that may be affecting both board diversity and firm performance. 85 Moreover, with so many different measures of firm performance from which to choose, researchers are likely to find some values that show a positive relationship with board diversity and others that show a negative relationship.
86
Scholars also question whether focusing on short-term accounting measures of financial performance is the best way to measure the impact of diversity. Research is lacking on the relationship between board diversity and long-term stock price performance, which is the "gold standard" measure of shareholder value.
87
These mixed quantitative results may reflect not only differences in research methodology, but also differences in the context in which diversification occurs.
88
For example, some studies suggest that the influence of minority directors on corporate boards is heavily shaped not only by the prior experience of the directors, but also by the "larger social structural context in which demographic differences are imbedded." 89 The failure to include a critical mass of women or minorities may in some cases prevent the potential benefits of diversity.
90
Those benefits may also be dampened by corporations' well-documented tendency to appoint women and minorities who are least likely to challenge the status quo, or who are "trophy directors," with too many board positions to provide adequate oversight. functions in different ways, making it difficult to establish any consistent relationship between board diversity and firm performance. 95 Although empirical research has drawn much-needed attention to the underrepresentation of women and minorities on corporate boards, it has not convincingly established that board diversity leads to improved financial performance. 96 Given the limitations of these studies, many commentators believe that the "business case for diversity" rests on other grounds, particularly its effects on board decision-making processes, corporate reputation, and governance capacities.
B. Diversity and Board Process, Corporate Reputation and Good Governance
A common argument by scholars, as well as board members of both sexes, is that diversity enhances board decision-making and monitoring functions.
98
This assertion draws on social science research on small-group decision making, as well as studies of board process and members' experiences. 99 The basic premise is that diversity may lessen the tendency for boards to engage in groupthink-a phenomenon in 95 See Nielsen & Huse, supra note 92, at 137-43 ("[M]ost empirical studies make no distinction between different board tasks and fail to acknowledge that women directors may have a differential rather than uniform impact on the effectiveness in fulfilling theoretically distinct board tasks."). 96 [S]ubjects have mentioned their beliefs that diversity creates a "richer conversation," "an entirely new perspective," "different points of view," and "a very positive dynamic." But it is a theoretical narrative without concrete detail, a story without substance. . . . Overall, our subjects tell a story that amounts to little more than "it seems like a good thing to do." John M. Conley, supra.
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100
The literature on board decision making reflects three different theories about the process through which diversity enhances performance. The first theory is that women and men have different strengths, and that greater inclusion can ensure representation of valuable capabilities. 101 For instance, some empirical evidence suggests that women generally are more financially risk averse than men. 102 For that reason, many commentators have speculated that women's increased participation in corporate financial decision making could have helped to curb tendencies that caused the most recent financial crisis. 103 A widely discussed panel at a World Economic Forum in Davos put the question: "Would the world be in this financial mess if it had been Lehman Sisters?" 104 Many Davos participants believed that the answer was no, and cited evidence suggesting that women were "more prudent" and less "ego driven" than men in financial management contexts. 105 One study found presence of at least one woman on a company's board was associated with a reduction of almost 40% in the likelihood of a financial restatement.
106
Other research pointed in similar directions, including 100 See IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK 3 (1972) (the original analysis of "group think"); see also Branson, supra note 35, at 795 (describing the role of diversity in preventing this dynamic on corporate boards; Seletha R. Butler For example, Phillips et al.'s study of group decision making found that when new members were "socially similar" to existing team members, subjective satisfaction was high but actual problem solving results were not.
116
Although team members rated productivity much lower when newcomers were socially dissimilar, the more heterogeneous group was much better at accomplishing the problem-solving task. 117 A diverse board can also enhance the quality of a board's decision-making and monitoring functions because diverse groups are less likely to take extreme positions and more likely to engage in higher-quality analysis.
118
Some scholars have also suggested that diverse boards can help prevent corporate corruption because they are "bold enough to ask management the tough questions."
119
According to one study, female directors expanded the content of board discussions and were more likely than their male counterparts to raise issues concerning multiple stakeholders.
120
Research has found that heterogeneous groups are to better governance because women and minority directors seem to ask different questions than white male directors, and that they bring different experiences and concerns to the table); Ramirez, supra note 100, at 840-41 (arguing diversity alters the functioning and deliberative style of boards and would lead to a new culture of scrutiny and reduce corporate corruption). But some commentators have questioned the degree to which gender and racial diversity necessarily equates with diverse perspectives. See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 91, at 468 (noting women executives cannot be too masculine or feminine). 115 71, 75 (2000) . 119 Ramirez, supra note 100, at 841. 120 See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 109, at 9. In a study of Israeli companies in which the government holds a substantial equity interest and has required relative gender balance for 20 years, Schwartz-Ziv found that boards with at least three directors of each gender in associated with broader information networks as well as increased creativity and innovation. 121 One study concluded that board racial diversity increased innovation by expanding access to information and networks, and prompting more thorough evaluation. 122 Overall, studies on the relationship between board diversity and its capacity for strategic change have reached conflicting results. 123 Although research suggests that functionally or occupationally diverse groups may solve problems more quickly and effectively than homogeneous teams, demographic diversity may not improve decisionmaking processes and outcomes in the same ways.
124
The educational, socioeconomic, and occupational backgrounds of women and minority directors tend to be quite similar to those of other directors. 125 Accordingly, some commentators have questioned the extent to which demographic diversity brings relevant diversity in perspectives.
126 Even when women and minorities have a different view, if they are attendance were twice as likely to both request further information and to take an initiative, compared to boards without such "critical masses," boards with at least three female directors were more likely to experience CEO turnover when performance was weak, and individual male and female directors were more active when at least three women directors were present at board meetings. See Schwartz-Ziv, supra note 59, at 22. 121 This study found that board racial diversity had a positive and significant relationship with innovation and reputation and that board gender diversity had a positive and significant association with innovation but not with firm performance. Id. at 755. Board racial diversity had a positive and significant relationship with firm performance, though board gender diversity did not have a significant effect. See id. When control variables for innovation and reputation were included in the regression, the effect of board racial diversity on performance was reduced. Id. at 769, 771-73. The authors attempted to determine if causation was running in the opposite direction and concluded that the possibility of reverse causality was minimal. represented at only token levels, they may lack sufficient leverage to influence the discussion. Studies on the influence of gender on leadership behavior are mixed, but some suggest that men and women who occupy the same role tend to behave similarly. 127 Moreover, in some studies, demographic diversity leads to increased conflict and poor communication, which tend to counteract or dominate the benefit of broader perspectives.
128
Research also shows mixed effects of gender diversity on problem-solving abilities.
129
Diverse teams may also experience increased levels of anxiety and frustration. 130 One study found that racial (but not gender) diversity increased the risk of emotional conflict and that such interpersonal clashes characterized by anger, frustration, and other negative feelings adversely affect performance.
131
As Scott Page summarizes the evidence, demographically diverse groups tend to outperform homogeneous groups "when the task is primarily problem solving, when their identities translate into relevant tools, when they have little or no [difference in what they value], and when their members get along with one another." 132 A third theory on how diversity enhances performance is that the very existence of diversity alters board dynamics in ultimately positive ways. Mannix and Neale, for example, argue that the presence of visibly diverse members enhances a group's ability to handle conflict by signaling that differences of opinion are likely. diversity is less likely to handle conflict well because it is not expected.
134
Other scholars have drawn on this signaling theory to argue "that a diverse board conveys a credible signal to relevant observers of corporate behavior . . . ."
135
Board diversity can convey a commitment to equal opportunity, responsiveness to diverse stakeholders, and a general message of progressive leadership, which can enhance the corporation's public image. 136 Empirical evidence is limited, but some findings are consistent with this theory. Catalyst has found a relationship between the proportion of female directors and the proportion of female officers a corporation is likely to have in the future. 137 Other studies have indicated that in some sectors, the presence of female or minority directors can enhance a firm's reputation with consumers.
138
In explaining these findings, researchers have suggested that board diversity may enhance firm reputation by sending signals to investors "about the robustness of the governance mechanisms in place and the quality of the firm."
139 Yet the significance of such claims should not be overstated. It is unclear how aware employees, consumers, and the general public are concerning board composition.
Scholars also have attempted to determine whether diversity might affect the likelihood and effectiveness of whistleblowing.
140
Some theorists have claimed that women's frequent outsider status and greater experience of unfairness might increase their willingness to report misconduct.
141
By contrast, other commentators have noted that 134 See id. at 33 (discussing the value of diversity). 135 whistleblowing is correlated with high levels of self-esteem and perceived power-traits more likely to be associated with men.
142
Empirical evidence yields conflicting results. Early studies of federal workers showed that men were more likely than women to be whistleblowers. 143 Subsequent studies have reached inconsistent conclusions, and more recent studies have found no gender differences in the likelihood of whistle-blowing. 144 Additional empirical studies have identified a positive correlation between diversity and other measures of good governance. Adams and Ferreira, for example, found firms that have a higher representation of women hold more meetings, have higher attendance rates, experience greater participation in decision making, engage in tougher monitoring, and are more likely to replace a CEO when the stock performs poorly.
145
Ibrahim and Angelidis' survey of nearly 400 corporate directors concluded that female directors exhibit a stronger commitment to corporate social responsibility.
146
A study by the Conference Board of Canada found that, on average, organizations whose boards have two or more women adopt a greater number of accountability practices and regularly review more non-financial performance measures than 142 MICELI & NEAR, supra note 141, at 121; MICELI, NEAR & DWORKIN, supra note 141, at 62 (noting that "theory suggests that men will be somewhat more likely to report wrongdoing than will women" because men occupy a greater proportion of high-status positions with opportunities to observe wrongdoing and a greater proportion of professions with ethical codes that encourage whistleblowing, and women may experience greater harm from whistleblowing because it is seen as a nonconforming behavior). 143 organizations with all-male boards. 147 The study further found that boards with more women paid greater attention to audit and risk oversight than all-male boards. 148 However, as in many of the preceding studies, correlation does not demonstrate causation, and it could be that well-governed corporate boards are more committed to diversity and seek greater gender parity. 149 Moreover, in Adams and Ferreira's 2009 study, although a higher proportion of women correlated with better board monitoring, it had a negative effect on financial performance in well-governed firms. 150 Given the competing findings and methodological limitations of these studies, the financial benefits of board diversity should not be overstated. 151 But neither should boards understate other justifications for diversity, including values such as fairness, justice, and equal opportunity, as well as the symbolic message it sends to corporate stakeholders. 152 A diverse board signals that women's perspectives are important to the organization, and that the organization is committed to gender equity not only in principle but also in practice. 153 Further, corporations with a commitment to diversity have access to a wider pool of talent and a broader mix of leadership skills than corporations that lack such a commitment. 154 For example, the adverse publicity that Twitter received when it went public with a board of all white men is a case study in the reputational costs of a leadership structure that fails to reflect the diversity of the user community it serves.
IV. BARRIERS TO ACHIEVING DIVERSITY
Given the growing support for diversity on corporate boards, why has it been so difficult to achieve? One obvious explanation is that the research on performance is too mixed to make diversification a priority. Antonio Perez, CEO of Kodak, put the point bluntly: "the real barrier . . . [is that many] corporations don't believe that it is a business imperative." 156 Other explanations involve unconscious bias and the counterproductive effects of tokenism. 157 These factors both directly impede appointment of qualified female and minority candidates, and prevent others from gaining the leadership experience that would make them attractive choices. 158 A third explanation is resistance to "special preferences." 159 As with other forms of affirmative action, opponents believe that selecting members on the basis of race or gender reinforces precisely the kind of color consciousness and sex stereotyping that society should be seeking to eliminate. 160 
A. Lack of Leadership Experience
One of the most common reasons for the underrepresentation of women and minorities on corporate boards is their underrepresentation in the traditional pipeline to board service. 161 The primary route to board directorship has long been through experience as a CEO of a public corporation. Indeed, one study found over one-half of male Fortune 500 directors were CEOs or former CEOs. 162 A National Association of Corporate Directors survey found CEO-level experience the most important functional background in the search for a new director, with 97% of respondents considering professional experience "critical" or "important" for board candidates. 163 Given the low representation of women and minorities in top executive positions, their talents are likely to be underutilized if selection criteria are not broadened. Women constitute only 3.5% of Fortune 1000 CEOs and 14.6% of Fortune 500 executive officer positions. 164 Minorities make up 4.6% of Fortune 500 CEOs. 165 Even women and minorities who reach upper-level management positions often do so through routes other than profit and loss responsibility, which provides crucial experience for board positions. 166 From male directors' perspective, lack of executive experience is the primary reason why the percentage of women on boards is not increasing. 167 However, recent developments-including requirements of director independence and financial expertise, restrictions on current CEOs serving on outside boards, and increased attention on age and tenure limits-may encourage boards to revisit traditional criteria for board service and expand the pipeline for women and minorities. 168 The number of active CEOs who serve on the boards of other public companies, and the proportion of newly elected independent directors who are CEOs, has decreased significantly during the last decade. 169 
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There is "no widely accepted" research demonstrating that active CEOs make better board members or lead to improved advice or monitoring by the board. 170 In fact, one survey found that 79% of corporate directors do not believe that "active-CEO directors [are] better than average directors."
171 As more corporations have positive experiences with board members of varied backgrounds, they may see the value in relying less on chief executives, whose experience may come at a cost because they are "used to running the show" and juggle intense competing priorities.
B. Bias
Another barrier to diversity in the selection of corporate boards, and in the corporate management pipeline that feeds them, is "in-group" bias-the preferences that individuals feel for those who are like them in important respects, including race, ethnicity, and gender. 173 Such bias is particularly likely in contexts where selection criteria are highly subjective, as is often true in board appointments. to be similar to the CEO.
175
Conversely, when the board is more powerful, new directors are more likely to be similar to existing board members. 176 In-group bias keeps women out of the informal networks of advice and support from which appointments are often made. 177 Female directors see exclusion from such networks as the most important reason for women's underrepresentation on corporate boards. 178 In-group favoritism also influences perceptions of competence. 179 Members of in-groups tend to attribute accomplishments of fellow members to intrinsic characteristics, such as intelligence, drive, and commitment. 180 By contrast, the achievements of out-group members are often ascribed to luck or special treatment. 181 Even in experimental situations where male and female performance is objectively equal, women are held to higher standards, and their competence is rated lower. 182 As one Australian study concluded, "women's competence has to be widely acknowledged in the public domain or through family connections before boards . . . will be prepared to 'risk' having a woman on the board." 183 Many women directors report they have to be "twice as good as men" to get board appointments. 184 In-group preferences often exclude women and minorities from the informal network of mentoring, contacts, and sponsorship support, all of which are critical for advancement. It follows that women and minorities are less likely to have the experience and credentials thought necessary for board appointments.
185
Lack of mentoring of minority and women directors also keeps them from obtaining additional board appointments.
186
Women of color in particular experience difficulties of isolation and exclusion. 187 Stereotypes about competence compound the problem. Despite recent progress, women and minorities often lack the presumption of competence enjoyed by white men, and need to work harder to achieve the same results. 188 Male achievements are more likely to be attributed to individual capabilities such as intelligence, drive, and commitment, and female achievements are more often attributed to external factors such as chance or special treatment-a pattern that social scientists label "he's skilled, she's lucky." 189 The more subjective the standard for assessing 185 qualifications, the harder it is to detect such biases. 190 Because subjective criteria are particularly significant in upper-level positions, women and minorities are particularly likely to be underrepresented in the pool from which directors are chosen. 191 In one Harvard Business School experiment, MBAs were given two case studies, identical except in one the CEO was named John and in the other was named Jane. 192 Students rated Jane more negatively. 193 Other gender stereotypes create further problems. Men continue to be rated higher than women on most of the qualities associated with leadership. 194 People more readily credit men with leadership ability and more readily accept men as leaders. 195 What is assertive in a man may seem abrasive in a woman, and female leaders risk seeming too feminine or not feminine enough. 196 Women who come across strongly may be seen as "ice queens" or "iron maidens," while women who adopt less assertive styles may seem weak or indecisive. 197 In effect, women face tradeoffs that men do not, making it more difficult for them to be both liked and respected in corporate board contexts, which require both. A telling recent experiment by Stanford Business School professor Francis Flynn gave participants a case study about a leading venture capitalist with outstanding networking skills. 198 Some of the participants were told that the individual was Howard Roizen; the others were told that she was Heidi Roizen.
199
The participants found working with Howard more enjoyable than working with Heidi, and they found Heidi less humble and more self-promoting and power hungry.
200
Minorities also confront traditional stereotypes, and women of color are doubly disadvantaged. 201 The stereotypes vary somewhat across different racial and ethnic groups, but share common features. The most common is the devaluation of competence; minorities who reach positions that might qualify them for board leadership are often assumed to be the beneficiaries of "special treatment" rather than meritocratic selection. 202 Class poses further obstacles. For example, Westphal and Stern have found that minorities from underprivileged "backgrounds must engage in a higher level of ingratiatory behavior toward [] CEO [s] . . ." than non-minorities and economically privileged individuals in order to obtain recommendations for board positions where the CEO is the lead director, or on boards on which the CEO is a member. 203 
C. Tokenism and Critical Mass
Whether appointment of only one or two female or minority directors will significantly improve board decision making remains unclear. 204 Rosabeth Moss Kanter's path-breaking research, confirmed in multiple subsequent studies, found that token members often encounter "social isolation, heightened visibility, . . . and pressure to adopt stereotyped roles. They are likely to do less well in the group, especially if the leader is a member of the dominant category." 205 Token members are often marginalized as representing the "woman's" or the "minority's" point of view, as if it were a monolithic position. 206 Thus, tokenism may make it more difficult for women and minorities to be heard on an equal basis with other board members. 207 Outsiders also may have limited opportunities to influence group decisions, particularly in the context of corporate boards where much of the real decision making takes place outside of official meetings and token members are excluded from informal socializing. 208 According to some research, a "critical mass" is necessary to realize fully the benefits of diversity on corporate boards. 209 As a report by the Wellesley Center for Women notes, "The magic seems to occur when three or more women serve on a board together. Suddenly having women in the room becomes a normal state of affairs. . . . [They] are no longer seen as outsiders and are able to influence the content and process of board discussions more substantially." 210 However, many women and minorities who have served on boards challenge critical mass theories to the extent that they imply that anyone serving as the first or second outsider "is doomed to fail." 211 They also fear that claims of tokenism may discourage women and minorities from accepting nominations, or that boards will treat three as "a safe harbor." 212 Already, some companies lose their sense of urgency once they appoint even a single outsider. As one board member noted, "When you're the only woman on the board and you talk about adding another woman, they say, 'But we've got you . . . .'" V o l . 3 9
The marginalization that token members experience may also impair their performance, which discourages further appointment of outsiders. For example, a director may "make herself socially invisible to avoid disrupting perceived group harmony and alleviate discomfort felt by the rest of the (all male) board." 214 As one woman put it, "[I]f you emphasize how different you are, you are considered a troublemaker." 215 The result is that women's strengths may go unrecognized, and their silence may reinforce "antiquated beliefs that a woman brings nothing new to the table." 216 Alternatively, some directors may fall into the role that sociologists identify as the "Queen Bee" syndrome, meaning that they "'revel in the notoriety of token status,' enjoy[] the perceived advantages of being the only woman in the group and 'excessively criticiz[e] potential women peers.'" 217 V. STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE Strategies to counteract these dynamics and increase board diversity fall into three main categories. The first category focuses on increasing individuals' capacity for service.
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The second category includes legal strategies that might expand the pool of qualified members and level the playing field for their appointment.
219
The third category targets institutions, and attempts to motivate corporations to take voluntary steps to enhance diversity.
220
In recent years, countries throughout the world have taken significant steps through legislation, regulation, and encouragement of voluntary efforts to increase the representation of women on boards.
221
These efforts have led to some measurable progress, but their most significant contribution may be the increased focus on gender diversity on corporate boards and in other leadership positions.
A. Strategies for Individuals
One obvious way to expand the number of women and minorities on corporate boards is to increase the pool of qualified applicants. Formal mentoring programs, leadership workshops, diversity advisors or coaches, and related strategies can all help interested applicants shape their career paths, refine their resumes, develop networking strategies, and overcome barriers to self-promotion. 222 In recent years, mentoring and networking programs targeted toward increasing women's representation on boards have become more prevalent in some countries, including the UK, Canada, France, and Australia. 223 Providing mentors who themselves have had board experience may be especially critical in bringing qualified candidates to the attention of board nominating committees. 224 Australia has had success in educating potential female directors and then pairing them with mentors who pledge to assist them for a year and at the close of the relationship to help place them on a corporate board.
225
In the United States, many private groups, in association with advocacy groups and universities, have pursued a strategy of establishing and expanding female director networks and providing mentors to aspiring board members. V o l . 3 9
B. Legal Strategies
Law can also play a greater role in reducing the obstacles to women and minorities who seek leadership positions, including both board appointments and the managerial experience that makes candidates attractive.
One common proposal is to require corporations "over a certain size to disclose data concerning recruitment, retention, and promotion[]" of women and minorities. 227 A number of countries mandate such disclosures, 228 and obligating U.S. companies to supply such information would make it easier for corporations to benchmark their performance relative to other similarly situated organizations, and for stakeholders to hold poor performers accountable. 229 The government could also require transparency surrounding the board search process by requiring companies to disclose whether women and minority candidates were considered or interviewed for open positions. An even stronger approach would be to encourage corporations to adopt a version of the "Rooney Rule," applicable to professional football. The National Football League (NFL) requires teams to pledge to include a minority candidate among the finalists for each coaching and general manager position and to conduct an on-site interview with that finalist. 230 In the seven years after "the rule was adopted in 2003, the number of black head coaches in the NFL increased from 6% to 22%." A second legal strategy would be to increase enforcement resources for anti-discrimination initiatives.
Although in theory individuals can sue for sex or racial discrimination in leadership positions, the difficulties of proof and the threat of blacklisting make such litigation extremely rare. 233 However, state and federal equal opportunity agencies could be more proactive in investigating organizations with a poor performance on gender and racial equity. 234 A third possibility would be to follow the example of sixteen countries that have established quotas for board membership for at least some companies. 235 Some commentators argue that quotas for women directors are necessary in the United States to overcome structural impediments and to help female directors reach or exceed a critical mass. 236 Norway led the way by requiring publicly listed firms with corporate boards of nine or more members to have a minimum of 40% of female directors by 2008, or face dissolution. 237 The Norwegian government has reported full compliance with the program, which increased women's share of board seats from 7% in 2002 to over 40%. 238 Spain and the Netherlands have recently followed suit with legislation requiring firms to meet a 40% female director minimum by 2015. 239 V o l . 3 9 fifth; and Finland requires government bodies and state-owned enterprises to have equal representation of men and women absent "special reasons to the contrary." 240 Effective in 2017, France will impose a 40% quota. 241 UK, Germany, Belgium, and Sweden are also debating similar legislation. 242 In other parts of the world, the United Arab Emirates and India now require certain companies to have women on their boards. 243 Critics contend quotas do not address the problems that prevent underrepresented groups from obtaining leadership experience, and that the focus should be on eliminating those obstacles and enhancing the qualifications of women and minorities. 244 According to some commentators, the dramatic increase in Norwegian female directors "has done little-yet-to improve either the professional caliber of the boards or to enhance corporate performance." 245 Quotas have not changed women's underrepresentation in top management, nor have they stimulated changes in the gender composition of small private companies not subject to quotas. 246 The shortage of women with executive experience has led to trophy directors, or "golden skirts" as they are called in Norway.
247 Some worry that the phenomenon has become selfperpetuating because "young female executives [] faced with the choice of pushing on to reach top positions or taking several board roles" have opted for the latter course. 248 Partly for that reason, women lack the experience that would give them board leverage and are underrepresented in the most powerful board positions: they account for 40% of board members but only 7% of board chairs.
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Critics further argue quotas will simply lead to more unqualified directors, either because of an insufficient supply of well prepared women, or because boards will fill seats with women who won't speak up. 250 For example, in France, "[i]n private, chief executives say they will look for female board members . . . who will look decorative and not rock the boat."
251
Evidence on the impact of quotas on financial performance and governance is mixed. Some research suggests that the increased presence of women correlates with slight losses in companies' bottom lines, which has been linked to women's lower levels of top management experience. 252 However, the presence of more women on boards has also reportedly led to more focused and strategic decision making and decreased conflict. In the United States, resistance to quotas builds on longstanding concerns about any departure from meritocratic principles. 254 Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg typifies this view. When asked in 2011 why his five-member board had no women, he responded, "I'm going to find people who are helpful, and I don't particularly care what gender they are . . . . I'm not filling the board with check boxes." 255 Many individuals worry that preferential treatment will stigmatize beneficiaries and diminish their credibility. 256 That may be part of the reason why a majority of American female directors oppose quotas, even though they believe the strategy would be effective in increasing board diversity. 257 Some of the resistance to quotas in the U.S. may also be based on skepticism that increasing the number of women on boards is an important goal, as evidenced by the fact that the discussion often still focuses on why it matters to have more women on corporate boards.
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Other countries, particularly in Europe, have moved past that stage and are debating the appropriate mechanism by which to achieve that objective. 259 So far in the U.S., the only legislative action related to 254 REPORT 27 (Nov. 9, 2012) (U.K.) (noting that quotas would be unpopular among many potential beneficiaries and would risk fostering the perception that women appointed were not there on their merit). 257 One study shows that 39% of women directors opposed quotas, although 51% believed that they are an effective tool for increasing board diversity. GROYSBERG & BELL, supra note 167, at 4 (noting also that 25% of men believe quotas to be an effective tool and that 18% of men support the use of quotas). 258 [I]n the United States, there is still a sense that an emphasis on gender diversity needs to be justified rather than pursued as a matter of course. In Europe and elsewhere, the discussion surrounding legislative initiatives tends to be focused on the best way to achieve greater gender diversity rather than whether or not it is a worthwhile goal. See also Karyn L. Twaronite, Women on Boards: Moving from "Why" to "How," FORBES, Jan. 8, 2013, archived at http://perma.cc/BR9D-WP6S.
increasing gender diversity on boards has taken a voluntary approach. For example, in August 2013, the California State Senate passed a resolution formally urging companies to increase gender diversity on their boards. 260 Given the resistance to quotas, some advocates of diversity recommend a "comply-or-explain" approach. 261 This approach can take several forms. A common proposal is "companies with a lower proportion [than 30% women on their boards] would have to explain [in their annual reports] if they proposed to fill a vacancy with a man." 262 Similarly, companies with no minorities or a small percentage of minorities on their boards would have to explain if they intended to fill a vacancy with a non-minority. 263 Social science research suggests that requiring individuals to give reasons for particular actions improves decision-making quality, reduces reliance on stereotypes, and helps to level the playing field for underrepresented groups. 264 The UK has a different version of comply-or-explain. 265 The 2010 revision of the country's corporate governance code (with which the country's largest 350 companies' boards should comply) included the principle that companies should conduct searches for board candidates "with due regard for the benefits of diversity on the board, including gender." 266 V o l . 3 9 corporations are subject to a comply-or-explain mandate. 268 "Companies should establish a policy concerning diversity and disclose the policy or a summary of that policy. The policy should include requirements for the board to establish measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity for the board to assess annually both the objectives and progress in achieving them." 269 Seventeen other nations have similar comply-or-explain provisions, 270 and the European Council is considering a directive that would require large, publicly traded firms to describe their policy on board diversity and the outcomes that have flowed from it. 271 If companies do not have such a policy, they must provide a "clear and reasoned explanation as to why this is the case." 272 The United States has adopted a comply-or-explain approach in other corporate governance contexts. For example, under the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, companies must disclose whether they have adopted a code of ethics for senior financial managers and whether their boards' audit committees have at least one financial expert. 273 If they have not adopted such a code or appointed an expert, the companies must explain why. 274 Also, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, firms must disclose whether they have separated the role of the board chair and chief executive officer, and if they have not done so, explain why not. 275 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enacted a rule, which went into effect in 2010, pushing companies in the direction of comply-or-explain on diversity issues. 276 The rule requires companies to disclose "whether, and if so how, the nominating committee (or the board) considers diversity in identifying nominees for director." 277 In addition, companies whose boards have a diversity policy must explain how the policy is implemented and how the company assesses its effectiveness. 278 The SEC allows companies to define diversity "in ways that they consider appropriate," and acknowledges that some may focus on racial, ethnic, and gender diversity, while others may "conceptualize diversity expansively to include differences of viewpoint, professional experience, education, skill and other individual qualities and attributes that contribute to board heterogeneity . . . ." 279 Aaron Dhir's forthcoming analysis of the first two years of experience under this rule finds that almost all companies (98%) claim to consider diversity in making board appointments. 280 Only 8%, however, reported having a formal diversity policy. 281 According to Dhir, his study's "most salient" finding is that when interpreting diversity, the "dominant corporate discourse is experiential . . . rather than identity-based. In other words, most frequently firms define diversity in reference to a director's prior experience, or other generic factors, rather than his or her socio-demographic characteristics."
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The rule would be stronger if the SEC made clear that consideration of diversity constitutes a policy triggering additional disclosure requirements, and if the Commission defined diversity to include race, gender, and other demographic characteristics.
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As Dhir notes, identity-related characteristics were what commentators on the rule wanted to see disclosed. 284 An even more effective approach in securing transparency and accountability would be to require companies to adopt policies with measurable objectives for achieving diversity and assess progress in achieving them, or to explain why they have not adopted such policies. V o l . 3 9
Comply-or-explain approaches are more politically palatable than mandatory quotas, but their effectiveness remains uncertain. 286 Future research will be necessary to see if these approaches actually produce higher rates of female and minority representation on boards.
C. Institutional Initiatives
Corporations can intensify their diversity efforts, both at the board level and in their internal policies, to help build the pipeline of women and minorities qualified for future appointments. 287 One option is to set their own goals or requirements for new appointments to ensure a critical mass of women and minorities. 288 Some commentators advocate a "structured search" that starts with an analysis of the board's functional needs and then identifies female and minority candidates who could fill them. 289 Whatever the process, companies need to establish an inclusive nominating committee that is sensitive to the value of diversity. 290 They also need to expand their searches beyond the traditional pool of CEOs and consider other corporate executives, nonprofit directors and officers, and academic presidents and experts. 291 Many commentators believe the current pool of potential members is large enough to achieve diversity if qualifications are appropriately broadened.
backgrounds. 293 These and other efforts to demonstrate a commitment to diversity could help boards make service seem more attractive to wellqualified members of underrepresented groups. 294 Companies could also institute age limits and term restrictions, which open up seats for women and minorities. 295 As one commentator put it, "What's holding women back isn't bias. It's the fact that no one ever leaves the boards." 296 Board members are often reluctant to give up positions that provide prestige and a significant salary, especially at the end of their careers. 297 Despite the thousands of board seats within large public companies, relatively few seats turn over on a yearly basis. 298 The number of available positions has been decreasing in recent years, 299 although in 2013 S&P 500 boards added the most new independent directors since 2008. 300 The reduced turnover among public company directors is in large part due to the increasing average age of directors. Forty percent of public company directors are age 68 or older. 301 Even if women were to receive the majority of new board appointments, the progress in increasing women's representation on corporate boards will continue to be slow unless the number of seats becoming available significantly increases.
302 V o l . 3 9 may be skewed by their desire to maintain control and high levels of compensation. 303 Such considerations may lead them to prefer candidates who share their interests-socially similar, fellow CEOs. 304 Simply giving the board more power over the appointment process could expand the pool of potential candidates.
A fourth institutional initiative should focus on making board diversity (or its absence) more visible and enlisting pressure from stakeholder groups to hold organizations accountable. Some empirical research has demonstrated a significant increase in women and minority directors when companies include pictures of the board in annual reports. 305 Several companies in Silicon Valley, including HewlettPackard, Intel, Google, Yahoo, Facebook, and LinkedIn, have released information about the diversity of their employees and leaders. 306 The breakdowns by gender and race and ethnicity are very similar for many of these technology companies, whose workforces tend to be 60-70% male and approximately 90% white and Asian, with only 3 to 4% Hispanic employees and 2% African-American employees. 307 Many of the companies released the numbers through official blog posts pledging their commitments to increasing diversity and transparency. 308 Voluntary disclosure efforts such as these can help bring more attention to the issue and may increase pressure on companies to make more diverse board appointments.
Large institutional investors could also demand such disclosure and use their leverage as shareholders to advance gender diversity among companies in which they hold significant stakes. 309 The Thirty Percent Coalition is a group-composed of leading women's organizations, institutional investors, executives, elected officials, and concerned individuals-that joined together in 2011 to achieve 30% representation of women on public company boards in the United States by 2015. 310 The Coalition has reported some success using letter-writing campaigns and shareholder resolutions to target companies with no women serving on their boards. 311 Organizations can bring more attention to the performance of particular companies by publishing report cards evaluating companies on board diversity. One organization, 2020 Women on Boards, publishes an annual Gender Diversity Index of Fortune 1000 Companies. 312 U.S. Stock exchanges, such as NASDAQ and NYSE, could follow the example of exchanges in Australia 313 and New Zealand 314 disclosure regarding board composition and search processes, or even adopt a comply-or-explain approach as a best practice. 315 Investors can also act, individually and collectively, to make board diversity a higher priority in investment decisions. For example, in 2009, the Women's Leadership Fund was created to invest up to $2 billion in publicly listed companies with a high percentage of women in senior positions, including board members, and to take activist positions in companies lacking such gender representation. 316 As a general matter, however, diversity-related proxy proposals submitted to American corporations have not been frequent. 317 Nor have investors initiated significant informal contact with companies concerning issues of gender and racial inclusion. 318 More investors should pursue such strategies to reward and reform companies based on their diversity records. 319 A final institutional strategy is for organizations that publish indexes for socially responsible investing and corporate social responsibility to include measures of diversity in leadership. 320 Only a few publications now compile information along these lines, despite evidence that some investors are interested in receiving it. 321 If diversity on boards becomes part of the standard criteria for measuring corporate social responsibility, then the ability of investors, consumers, and publicinterest organizations to hold corporations accountable would increase.
VI. CONCLUSION
As recent initiatives make clear, board membership remains a significant issue in the struggle for more equitable leadership structures. In this context, it matters to get the arguments right, and to make the case for diversity on the basis of strong equitable and reputational arguments rather than more contested links between board membership and financial performance. The gains in diversity that corporate America has made over the last quarter century testify to our capacity for progressive change. But the distance we remain from truly inclusive corporate boards reminds us of the progress yet to be made.
